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IN THE SUPREME. COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM B. HARVEY and 
RUTH l\I. HARVEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
HAIGHTS BENCH IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 




This action was brought by the plaintiffs to enjoin 
the defendant from placing water acquired from a new 
or different source in their irrig.ation ditch across plain-
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tiffs' land, except during the period water had been 
placed therein in the past from Farmington Canyon and 
from maintaining a cement ditch on plaintiffs' land. 
Plaintiffs also asked for general damages to their 
land caused by reason of the improvements made by 
defendant and for punitive damages (R. 1-4). 
The Court denied plaintiffs' right to injunctive 
relief (R. 218). The jury returned a verdict of $400.00 
general damages and $400.00 punitive damages upon 
which judgment was entered (R. 7-8). 
The parties will be referred to as plaintiffs and 
defendant as in the case below. 
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs are the owners of approximately 
35 acres of land in Davis County, State of lltah, located 
2112 miles northeast of Farn1ington and about one-half 
1nile from any paved lligh,Yay (R. ±±~ 7S). To reach 
this p,roperty you n1ust cross over another piece of 
property O\Yned by plaintiffs by a "'"agon trail or go 
over a dirt road " ... hirh crosses the property of ~Ir. Phil-
lips that lies to the \Vest (R. 73). 
The property " ... as purcl1ased in 1938 for the sun1 of 
$1,000.00. It has never been cultiYated or irrigated and 
no crop~s have been raised thereon (R. 68). The defend-
ant has 1naintained over and across the "'"est ru1d south-
west portion of said land an irrigation ditcl1 (Exhibit 
"A") through \Yhieh it has conyeyed \Y·ater to its stock-
holders for over forty years (R. 163, 186). 
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In the Fall of 1955 defendant improved the northerly 
portion of said ditch by cementing the ditch for a dis-
tance of 750 feet (R. 48). The cement ditch is 7 feet 
wide at the top, 3 feet deep with sloping sides and has 
a 14 inch flat bottom (R. 51) as shown by Exhibits "K" 
and "I." The purp·ose of cementing this portion of the 
ditch was to conserve water (R. 115) by stopping seep-
age and to prevent the flooding of Mr. Phillips' land 
(R. 154). 
The plaintiffs described the old ditch before the 
same was cemented as being 6 to 8 feet wide, about 1¥2 
to 2 feet deep with an average depth of one foot; that 
water would flow in the ditch from the forepart of April 
until the 4th of July and the flow would not exceed 15 
feet. (R. 45). 
The defendant's testimony showed that the old ditch 
at the bottom was 6 to 8 feet wide and would run from 
10 to 12 feet at the top. Where the gravel had been 
cleared out and piled up on the west bank it would meas-
ure 25 or 30 feet to the east bank (R. 165, 167, 188). In 
the later years dirt had been placed on the east hank 
to the extent of 10 feet (R. 189). 
The defendant was required to use the type of con-
struction it did in cementing the ditch in order to obtain 
financial .assistance from the Government. The plans 
and specifications were recommended by the Soil Con-
servation Service, Department of Agriculture of the 
United States. They had been developed in conjunction 
with other Federal Agencies and engineers and were in 
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accordance with the national standard followed and 
adopted by the Soil~C·onservation Service in Washington. 
The entire project was designed and supervised by Glen 
Austin, the engineer for the Soil Conservation Service. 
Mr. Austin testified that they could not have put in any 
other type or style of ditch and obtained part of the 
expense from the Government, and that the ditch was 
the most feasible, economical and efficient ditch for 
that particular territory (R. 121, 122). 
In the early days the ditch was cleaned by using 
horses and a scraper, but since the advent of tractors 
modern equipment has replaced the horses (R. 164). 
Prior to the improvements one \Yas able to go along the 
west bank with a wagon (R. 178, 188). In improving 
the ditch a bulldozer '"·as used on the top of the pile 
of sand that was on the "Test side so that soil could be 
pushed hack into the ditch. This \Yas necessary to 
straighten the ditch in its old original channel. In order 
to improve the ditch it 'ras necessary to take out some 
cottonwood trees growing do,vn to the \Yater~s edge and 
scrub oak on the ditch banks (R. 1±3~ 16'7). 
All of the 'vitnesses for the defendant, including 
C. W. Lauritzen, who is connected \vith the Irrigation 
Department of the College at Logan .and 'rho is also 'vith 
the Agriculture Researeh Serviee of the lTnited States 
Government, and Mr. Austin, the Engineer in charge, 
testified that it was necessary to use as 1nuch land as 
they had along both the west and e.ast banks in order 
to bring in the equip1nent and do the \\~ork (R. 116, 128). 
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The present ditch is much smaller than the old ditch. 
The scarred area and where the road is now located was 
originally a part of the old ditch hank (R. 167). 
In relation to the damages and value of the p·roperty 
Mr. Beesley, a real estate broker and land appraiser of 
Bountiful called by plaintiffs, testified that the land 
was worth $1,000.00 an acre. This valuation was based 
upon the fact that in the future it might develop into a 
housing project which is its ·highest potential use (R. 
111). In his opinion the concrete ditch impaired its 
value by 25 to 30 percent (R. 105) and the removal of 
the o.ak brush would depreciate its value by about another 
10 percent (R. 106). 
Mr. E. J. Sharon, a realtor who makes property 
valuation appraisals for the Veteran:S Administration, 
banks and insurance companies, testified for the defend-
ant that the land was worth about $100.00 an acre. In 
his opinion the land was not suitable to be subdivided 
for a housing project because of its location (R. 150) 
and that even if the land were used for a housing project 
the ditch, whether cemented or not, would not affect its 
valuation (R. 151). 
Prior to commencing the work Mrs. Harvey was 
advised what defendant intended to do (R. 197). After 
defendant had been working on the ditch for a week 
Mr. Harvey went over to see what they were doing and 
thereafter advised them that they could go ahead and 
put in the ditch provided they would cover it. He made 
no complaint about the road or the oak brush but only 
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complained in relation to the type of the ditch (R. 47, 
77). 
There is no dispute as to the fact that the defendant 
intends to use the ditch to convey the water contracted 
for from the Weber Basin Conservatory District (R. 
155) and that the water will be placed in a ditch after 
the Farmington Canyon water is gone (R. 160). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO USE AS MUCH 
LAND ON EACH SIDE OF THE DITCH AS WAS REASON-
ABLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN, REPAIR, IMPROVE 
AND ENJ·OY ITS EASEMENTS. 
II. THE QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
III. 'THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO USE AS MU·CH 
LAND ON EACH SIDE OF THE DITCH AS "'"AS REASON-
ABLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN, REPAIR, IMPROVE 
AND ENJOY ITS EASEMENTS. 
Under this point ,,~e "~in also discuss the errors com-
mitted by giving Instructions Nos. 5 and 6 and failing 
to give defendant's Requested Instruction X o. 5. 
Under the decision of Bi!l Cottonzcood Ta;1ne 1· Ditch 
Company v. lJfoylc, 109 lTtah 213, 17± P. 2d l±S, defend-
and had the right to i1nprove its ditch in the interest 
of w;ater conservation and as long as it carries out this 
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7 
right to improve in a reasonable manner, plaintiffs have 
no legal grounds for complaint though the improvements 
result in decreasing the value of the servient estates. 
vVe, therefore, have two questions to be determined. (1) 
Did the defendant, in carrying out its rights to improve 
the ditch, do this in a reasonable manner~ (2) In making 
the improvements in a reasonable manner, did the de-
fendant have the right to use more land than that used 
during the p·rescriptive period~ 
Under the first point, Mr. Austin, Engineer for the 
Soil Conservation Service, testified that the present 
ditch was designed and construeted in accordance with 
the standard specifications developed by Federal Agen-
cies and adopted by the Soil Conservation Service in 
Washington; that the ditch was the mo.st feasible, econ-
omical and efficient ditch for that particular territory. 
There is no testimony contradicting this fact. In fact, 
to attain F·ederal assistance, it was necessary to con-
struct this type of ditch. 
In regard to the second question, let us analyze 
the statement made in the Big Cottonwood case, supra, 
which stated as follows: 
"In no case would the easement owner be 
allowed in improving his ditch to take more or 
different land from the servient estate than that 
used during the prescriptive p·eriod." 
Doe.s this mean that you cannot vviden the ditch or 
that you cannot use modern equipment if, in doing so, 
you would use temporarily more land .along the banks 
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than you would have used during the prescriptive period 
in the horse and buggy days' 
Under the facts it is contended that defendant did 
not use more land along the banks than during the 
p-rescriptive period. 
Under the authorities both of this jurisdiction and 
other.s, we have come to the conclusion that it must mean 
the first statement, that is, that you cannot widen your 
ditch. As a corollary to defendant's easement to con-
vey water across plaintiffs' land, defendant also has a 
secondary easement over the course of the ditch for the 
purpose of cleaning and maintenance. Simonson v. Moon 
(Idaho), 237 P. 2d 93, 169 A.L.R. 1148, Holm v. Davis, 
41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403. In the case of Laden t·s. Atkeson, 
112· Montana 302, 116 P. 2d 881, the Court quotes mth 
approval the following statement in Jones on Ease1nents: 
"In the same test, sec. 820, p. 659, the author 
recognizes the right to use adjacent soil for pur-
poses of repair in this language: 'In repairing 
a ditch or w.aterrace the o'vner of the easement 
has the incidental right to use the adj·acent soil 
for this purpose, in case the repairs cannot be 
made in any other 'vay. The fact that the earth 
so used is the p-roperty of the o'\\11er of the ser-
vient tenement does not settle the que.stion ,vhether 
the owner of th~ ease1nent may take it for the 
purpose of making repairs. •Tile o"Tner of the 
easement is privileged to repair in all cases "There 
the ·e.aseine~t cannot be enjoyed ,vithout repairs: 
and In making them, he 111a-y dig up tl1e soil and 
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otherwise use and encumber it, doing no more 
injury than is necessary, when such course is in-
dispensable to the enjoyment of the easement.' " 
The Laden case is cited with ap·proval in Salt Lake 
City v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, ____ Utah ____ , 253 P. 2d 
365. From these authorities the question seems to be 
not whether defendant used more land along the banks 
than had previously been use-d in making the repairs, 
but whether the s1ame was nece~ssary and reasonable 
in making the proper repairs and improvements to the 
ditch and in providing means for the proper use of the 
same. 
C. W. Lauritzen, who is connected with the College 
at Logan and with the Agricultural Research Service 
of the United States, testified that he had examined the 
land of the plaintiffs after the ditch had been cemented. 
In his opinion it was neces.sary to take out the scrub 
oak and use the land .along the banks in order to make 
the improvements. He stated that he did not see how the 
land had been damaged or that it had been unnecessarily 
disturbed. Such work was necessary to bring in equip-
ment for making the iinprovements. 
A11:stin, the Engineer in charge, testified that in 
order to concrete the ditch, the use of the land on the 
west was necessary in order to bring in the cement 
trucks and equipment and the use of th·e bank on the east 
was necessary in order to hold the slip form. There was 
also testimony that it was ne·cessary to scrape down the 
old high banks on the west in order to fill the ditch so 
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that the same might be straightened and put in condition 
to be cemented. No one testified that more land was used 
than was necessary in order to cement the ditch with 
modern equipment. 
The Court by giving its instruction.s No. 5 and 6,_ 
see page 15-16 of appendix, in one statement gave to the 
defendant the right to make the improvements, but in 
another statement endeavored to limit the amount of land 
to that used during the prescriptive period. We are of 
th·e opinion under the authorities cited that the true and 
correct statement of the law was set forth in defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 5 (See appendix page 19) 
which the Court refu.sed to give. 
II. 'THE QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Th·e Court should not have submitted to the jury 
the question of exemplary dan1ages. (Instruction X o. 10, 
appendix page 17). There is no testimony that the de-
fendant knew that its act in n1aking the improvements 
was wrongful .and that "~thout just c.ause it intentionally 
did the work. The defendant acted in good faith and 
in honest belief that it "\Yas la,vful to 1nake the improve-
ments as it did. Our Supren1e Court in nun1erous deci-
sions has held that to justify a recovery of exen1plary 
damages, the act causing the injury n1ust be done "\Yith 
,an evil intent and ,,,.ith the purpose of injuring the plain-
tiffs or with surh a \\'"anton and rPckless disregard of their 
rights as evidences a "\YrongfulinotiYe. Rugg v. Tobnau, 
39 Utah 295, 117 1-:>. 54, Calhoun Y. [;-niversal Cred£t Cont-
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pany, 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 284, Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 362, 267 P. 2d 759. 
Under the Court's instructions and the authorities 
the defendant had the right to go upon plaintiffs' land 
to make the improvements to its ditch. It advised plain-
tiffs that it was going to do so and Mr. Harvey did not 
object to the same except as to the type of the ditch. 
Mr. Harvey told them to go ahead and make it if they 
wanted to but they would have to cover it. The Su-
preme Court in the case of Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 
125 P. 403, stated : 
"In view of the foregoing, what were the 
rights of appellant with respect to entering upon 
the lands of respondent to repair and clean out 
the ditch or canal in question~ The right of the 
owner of an easement is admirably stated by Mr. 
Jones in his excellent work on Easements, sec. 814, 
in the following words: ''The owner of a dominant 
estate having an easement has a right to enter 
upon the servient estate, and make repairs neces-
sary for the reasonable and convenient use of the 
easement, doing no unnecessary injury to the 
servient estate.' A large number of cases in sup-
port of the doctrine are collated by th·e author in 
a footnote to the section aforesaid to which we 
refer the reader. The doctrine is also well illus-
trated and applied to an irrigating ditch by the 
Supreme Court of California in Joseph v. Ager, 
108 Cal. 517, 41 Pac. 422. The finding in the case 
at b.ar 'that in performing the work necessary 
thereto no unecessary damage or injury was done 
to the ground of the plaintiff' while not as specific 
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12 
as could be desired, yet must be construed to mean 
just what appellant by its servants and employes 
had a right to do, namely, to enter upon respond-
ent's land along the canal or ditch in question for 
the purpose of repairing and cleaning out the 
same, and, if in doing the work no unnecessary 
injury was done to respondent's land, appellant 
cannot be charged as a trespasser." 
III. 'THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY. 
We have already discussed the error committed by 
the Court in giving Instruction Nos. 5, 6 and 10 and the 
refusal to give defendant'~ Requested Instruction No. 5. 
The Court also committed error in giving Instruction 
No. 12 (Appendix, page 18). The defendant objected 
to the giving of the instruction and made a further ob-
jection to the first paragraph which is as follows: 
"You are instructed that the irrigation com-
pany has the right, under the eminent domain 
Laws of the State of Utah, to condemn a right of 
w.ay over the lands of the plaintiffs, and that by 
paying damages therefor the defendant could ac-
quire the right to cross the lands of the plaintiffs 
with such types of structures as defendant may 
·elect to use." (R. 212). 
This instruction 'Yent out of the pleadings and issues 
of this ca.se. It was prejudicial to defendant in that it 
stressed the fact that defendant should have taken sou1e 
other method of acquiring a right-of-"~ay "Thich it claims 
it alre:ady had.· 
Instructions should be confined to the issues pre-
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sented by the pleadings and the evidence. It is improper 
to give an in.struction announcing a naked legal proposi-
tion, however correct it may be, unless it bears upon 
and is connected with the isRues involved. Davis v. Mid-
vale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 74. 
In 53 Am. Jur., Sec. 574, page 453, it is stated: 
"* * * No instruction should be given by the 
court either on its own motion or at the request of 
counsel which tenders an issue that is not pre-
sented by the pleadings or supported by the evi-
dence, or which deviates therefrom in any ma-
terial respect. Requested instructions, even 
though correctly stating the law, which ignore an 
essential phase of a case that is supported by evi-
dence, or are without basis in the evidence, or are 
not applicable to the situation disclosed by the 
evidence, should and will be refused. To give such 
an instruction would tend to mislead the jury into 
the belief that such issue is before them, and may 
cause them to bring in an improper verdict. Ac-
cordingly, requests to charge are properly refused 
where they are directed or refer to matters wholly 
outside the issues as presented by the pleadings 
and made by the evidence, where they relate to a 
contention, theory, or ground of liability not p~re­
sented by the pleadings, or where they relate at 
mo.st to a single consideration or subsidiary fact 
bearing upon an issue. * * * ." 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 
283 P. 160 (Aug. 1929). 
"Appellants complain of the first sentence 
above upon the ground that it has no application 
to the facts in this case, that this accident did not 
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happen at a crossing or street intersection, and 
therefore the instruction is misleading and erron-
eous, and rely on the following cases: Wright v. 
Intermountain Motor Car c·o., 53 Utah 176, 177 
P. 237; Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 P. 
7 4; Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224 P. 885; 
Koutsis v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 63 
Utah 254, 225 P. 339. These cases ·establish the 
proposition that an instruction which relates to 
matters outside the issues, or as to which there is 
no substantial evidence, is improper.'' 
The failure of the Court to give defendant's Instruc-
tion No. 1 (Appendix 19) was ·erroneous in that the evi-
dence .shows that the defendant made its improvements 
in a reasonable and pTudent manner and without any 
unnecessary injury to the plaintiffs and the case should 
not have been submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment based 
upon the verdict of the jury should be reversed and in 
any ·event, a new trial should be granted in the matter. 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS 
MA·TTSSON & E\T ANS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




INSTRUCTION NO. 5 (R. 206-207) (Exception R. 221-
222) 
"You are instructed that the evidence shows and the 
plaintiffs admit that the defendant irrigation company 
i.s the owner of an easement to maintain a dirt canal 
across the lands of the plaintiffs to transport w.ater. 
This easement came into existence by more than 20 years 
of use, as distinguished from an express grant. When 
an easement come.s into existence by usage, as this one 
did, you are instructed that th.e easement is limited to 
the extent of the use historic.ally made and the defendant 
generally has no right to enlarge or extend the burden 
on plaintiffs' lands. 
You are instructed, however, that the law does grant 
to the owner of an easement for a canal the right to im-
prove the canal for the purpose of preventing waste of 
water, but the improvement of the dirt canal so as to 
prevent wa.ste of water may only be made so long as the 
new developments are reasonably made to conserve 
water and do not unnecessarily burden the lands of the 
plaintiffs, and in making the improvements the defendant 
had no right to rtake or use more land of the plaintiffs. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant in replacing the existing dirt canal 
with a cement canal went beyond what was reasonably 
necessary to conserve and prevent the waste of water, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
which defendant has historically take·n across the plain-
tiffs' lands, and that it unreasonably and unnecessarily 
increased the burden on the lands of the plaintiffs, the 
plaintiffs are enrtitled to recover from the defendant such 
an amount of money as you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate 
plaintiffs for the damage done, if any, by reason of extra 
burden on and damage to the plaintiffs' lands. If, on the 
other hand, you find that the cement canal as constructed 
was reasonably necessary for the water defendant has 
hi.storically taken across the plaintiffs' lands, or to take 
more lands, and to prevent the waste of that water, and 
that the type of construction did not unreasonably or un-
necessarily burden plaintiffs' land, then you are in-
structed that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover dam-
ages for the change from a dirt to a cement canal." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (R. 208-209) (Exception R. 221-
222) 
"You are instructed that the right of the defendant 
canal company to waterp-roof its canal for the purpose 
of preventing waste of "Tater does not extend to nor per-
mit the defendant to cut trees ru1d slrrubbery an·ywhere 
except in the eanal itself, or i1nn1ediate ly along its banks, 
and to the extent that the canal .and its banks have been 
historically occupied and used by the defendant in the 
maintenance of its canal. You are also instructed that 
defendant may not, in the 1naintenance of its e<lnal, leave 
debri.s and waste 1naterial piled on plaintiffs' land, ex-
cept as defendant 1nay have historically eut trees and 
left debris on plaintiff's land. 
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If you find from .a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant cut trees and shrubbery from the 
plaintiffs' lands without plaintiffs' permission beyond 
the canal and its banks previously oecupied and used by 
the defendant in the maintenance of its canal, and more 
than was reasonably necessary to the waterp·roofing of 
its ditch, or that defendant cut trees and shrubs and 
left them or other debris on plaintiffs' land, then you are 
instructed that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover com-
pensatory damages therefore, and you should proceed to 
assess the damage and to award to the plaintiffs such 
sum of money as will reasonably compensate plaintiffs 
for the damage thus done, if any you shall find, but in no 
event can compensatory damages be awarded in excess 
of $10,000.00. 
If, on the other hand, you shall find that the defend-
ant cut only trees and shrubbery through the are.a which 
it has historically occupied with its canal and in the main-
tenance thereof, and only to the extent rea.sonably neces-
sary to waterproof its canal, and that it left no debris 
or trees stacked on plaintiffs' land, then you are in-
structed that the defendant is not liable for any damages 
to the plaintiffs from cutting s.aid trees or from leaving 
debris, and you shall find this issue in favor of the de-
fendant." 
INS·TRUCTION NO. 10 (R. 211-212) (Exception R. 222) 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they shall find 
for the plaintiffs and that the defendant or its agents 
or servants committed a wrongful act or wrongful acts 
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upon the plaintiffs' land, or to the plaintiffs' property, 
and shall further find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that said wrongful act or .acts were willfully and 
intentionally done by defendant, in conscious disregard 
of the plaintiffs' right, then you may award the plaintiffs 
in addition to compensatory damages such additional 
sum, but not exceeding $5,000.00, as you may deem proper, 
by way of punishment to the defendant, and to deter the 
defendant and other persons from the commission of 
similar wrongs in the future, by the example thereby 
afforded." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 (R& 211-212) (Exception R. 222) 
"You are instructed that the irrigation company has 
the right, under the eminent domain la-\YS of the State 
of Utah, to condemn a right of "~ay over the lands of the 
plaintiffs, and that by paying damages therefor the 
defendant could acquire the right to cross the lands of 
the plaintiffs "'"ith such types of structures a$ defendant 
may elect to use. 
However, you are instructed that not"'ithstanding 
the right of eminent do1nain, as stated above, the defend-
ant did have the right to go upon the plaintiffs' land 
for the purpose of Inaintaining~ rleaning, repairing, 
waterproofing, and to prev-ent seepage, so long as the 
defendant did not unrea.sonably and unneces&arily in-
crease the burden to the plaintiffs' land in the exercise of 
the right the defendant had by reason of its ea.se1nent, 
as elsewhere in the preeeeding instructions explained." 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (R. 26) (Ex-
ception R. 220) 
"You are instructed that your verdict shall be in 
favor of the defendant .and against the plaintiffs, no 
cause of action." 
INSTRU~c·TION NO. 5 (R. 29) (Exception R. 220-221) 
"You are instructed that the defendant has a right 
of way and easement over the land of plaintiffs where it 
maintains its irrigation ditch, and by re.ason thereof it 
has the right to go upon plaintiffs' land to operate, re-
pair, maintain and improve its ditch. You are further 
instructed that the defendant in connection with the 
operation, repair, maintenance and the making of im-
provements to its ditch has the right to so much of the 
land on each side of the ditch as may be reasonably neces-
sary for the purpose of maintaining, repairing, improv-
ing and the enjoyment of its easement, and if you find 
from the evidence that that is all defendant has done, 
then even though there was some damage by reason 
thereof, your verdict shall be in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiffs, no cau.se of action." 
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